Tag: development

  • The Vital Compass: A Conversation With Vanessa Andreotti

    The Vital Compass: A Conversation With Vanessa Andreotti

    The second time I meet Vanessa Andreotti, we’re in the lobby of a Paris hotel. There are signs warning guests against trying to get around by taxi. It’s Saturday, 1st December, 2018 – or Act III, according to the calendar of the gilets jaunes protesters who are converging on the capital for the third weekend in a row, bringing half the city to a halt.

    We’re here for the Plurality University, a gathering of designers and thinkers and sci-fi writers brought together ‘to broaden the scope of thinkable futures’. There are distant sirens and smoke rising from the city below, and it feels like the future already arrived while we were busy looking the other way. So Vanessa and I slip away through the back streets, talking about what happens when the future fails. She’s just been back to Brazil, her home country, and she traces the lines that run from an eruption of anger that spilled out onto the streets there five years earlier to the election of Jair Bolsonaro. How much of today’s politics, around the world, is shaped by the dawning recognition that the ship of modernity – sailing under the flags of development and progress – is going down?

    ‘A lot depends,’ she says, ‘on whether people feel that the promises were broken, or whether they see that these were false promises all along.’

    The first step is an admission that something has gone badly wrong. This is the advantage that Trump had over Clinton, or the Brexiteers over the Remainers: whatever pile of lies they served it up with, they were able to admit that the ship is in trouble, while their opponents went on insisting that we were sailing towards the promised destination. In Brazil, the promise was that everyone could have the lifestyle of a new global middle class – and when this future failed to materialise, Bolsonaro was able to ride the anger of voters by claiming that it could have been theirs, if it hadn’t been for the corruption of his opponents. If the promises were broken, then we look for who to blame and how to take revenge. A lot depends, then, on the recognition that the promises could never have been kept; that they were not only unrealistic, but harmful. For only with this recognition is there a chance of working out what remains, what might be done, starting from the wreckage in which we find ourselves.

    For more than ten years, I have been seeking out conversations about what remains, looking for people with whom to think about the wrecked promises of modernity, ways of naming our situation and making it possible to talk together about it. The most illuminating of these encounters have been with people whose thinking was formed by finding themselves and their communities on the hard end of the processes of modernisation. As Gustavo Esteva and I discussed in Dark Mountain: Issue 4, there is a sense that the West is belatedly coming to know the shadows of development and progress, shadows all-too-familiar to those unto whom development was done.

    Vanessa Andreotti’s work deals with these shadows. Her institutional position at the University of British Columbia overlaps with her work as part of Gesturing Towards Decolonial Futures, a collaboration between academics, artists and indigenous scholars and communities. Six months on from that day in Paris, we record a conversation, and as I listen back to the recording, I’m struck by the sense that she is always speaking out of a collective, collaborative, ongoing process of thinking together. Every time we talk, there are new versions of the ‘social cartographies’, poetic maps that make it possible to have difficult conversations. The maps that emerge from Vanessa’s collaborations are boundary objects, places where we meet, where there is a chance of sitting with our discomfort, with our limits, maybe beginning to find a place within a world that is larger and stranger than that allowed for in the ways of seeing that shaped the modern world.

    DH — Looking back at the Dark Mountain Manifesto, there’s a passage towards the end where we talk about ‘redrawing the maps’, a theme I’ve found myself returning to regularly over the past decade. The drawing of maps is full of colonial echoes, so we talk about seeking the kind of maps that are ‘sketched in the dust with a stick, washed away by the next rain’. It’s this image of maps that are explicitly provisional and not pretending to the objective, detached, view-from-above quality that mapping often implies.

    That makes me think of what you call a ‘social cartography’ and the collection of maps that you’ve built up with your collaborators. Maybe a good place to start is to ask just what this way of mapping means to you?

    VA — You mentioned the colonial approaches to knowledge production, and I think we started there, with an intention to interrupt this totalising relationship with knowledge. In the work of the collective, we felt that maps – as images that could visibilise or invisibilise certain things – had the potential not to represent reality but to create metaphors. We wanted to create spaces for difficult conversations where relationships didn’t fall apart – and the cartographies have been our main tool for working through the difficulties, the hotspots, the tensions, the paradoxes and the contradictions of these conversations.

    So, for example, we have the cartography of ‘the house modernity built’ which is talking about the fundamental structure of modernity. There are two carrying walls and there is a roof that is structurally damaged, which is why the house is unstable, facing imminent collapse.

    We talk about the foundation of the house being the assumption of separability between humans and what we call ‘nature’. That separation then generates other types of separation, creating hierarchies between humans, and between humans and other species, and this is our understanding of the foundation of colonialism. In the collective, we don’t see colonialism as just the expansion of territory or the subjugation of people; we believe it starts with this foundational separability that interrupts the sense of entanglement of everything, that interrupts the sense that we are part of a metabolism that is the planet and that we belong to a much wider temporality within this metabolism. This separation takes away the intrinsic value of life within a wider whole and creates a situation where we are forced to participate in specific economies within modernity in order to produce value to ‘prove’ that we deserve to be alive.

    In the image of the house, one of the carrying walls is the carrying wall of the Enlightenment, or what we refer to as universal reason – this idea of a totalising, universalising form of rationality that wants to reduce being to knowing, that then creates a single story of progress, development and human evolution. The other carrying wall is the carrying wall of the nation state, which is often presented as a benevolent institution, but was primarily created to protect capital.

    The current roof of the house is the roof of financial shareholder capitalism, which is different from industrial capitalism. We talk about the differences between the two in terms of the possibility of tracing investments and of using the state as a means of both redistribution and some form of checks on capital.

    DH — The way the state used to act as a stabilising force within the system?

    VA — Yes, so now we have a speculative financial system where those checks and balances are eroded and where investment is at the expense of others. This investment in destruction is so normalised that even people fighting against climate change or for social justice end up not realising that by using a credit card – or by thinking about the continuity of, for example, our own pensions – we are participating in an economy that is primarily grounded on anonymity and destruction. So there is no way anybody participating in this economy can be innocent, whereas with industrial capitalism, it was much easier to trace the responsibilities: Ford as a manufacturer was embodied in Henry Ford, a person, where it was possible to say, ‘You have responsibilities in relation to society, in relation to your employees’. Today, Ford is a shareholder company and I don’t know if my pension contributions are already invested there, giving me a shareholder interest.

    I’m trying to make it simple enough, without losing the complexity of the connections between these things – because I think what these cartographies do is to connect dots in a way that works against our unconscious desires to not talk about the ways we are complicit in harm.

    DH — You said that a map like this is not claiming to represent reality, it’s offering a metaphor – and that reminded me of a thought about language that I found really helpful in one of your texts. It’s a two-fold distinction about what’s going on when we use language: one of which is an assumption that an objective description is being made, and the other is that language is always an action within the world, rather than a description of the world from above.

    VA — In this sense language mobilises realities. So instead of trying to index reality and meaning with a view to this totalising knowledge that can control reality and engineer something, what we do is see language as an entity that plays with us and we play with it. So the relationship with language becomes very different – and that’s why also, with the maps, they move and they do what they need to do and they need to change, because they are affectable by the world and by how people interact with them.

    We see that some of the maps are more stable than others because they are useful for more contexts, up to a point, but they can’t become canonical answers to universal problems. The keeping of the artificiality is really important, I think, because then it draws the attention to the process. It makes it an ongoing movement rather than an accurate description.

    DH — So going back to the cartography of the house – and the impossibility of not being tangled up with the systems that are perpetrating the destruction – that’s clearly part of what you’re trying to render visible, which makes for more difficult conversations than the ones that people often want to have. I feel like one of the reasons people shy away from those conversations is because they don’t know what to do if they let all this stuff in. It’s like a pit of despair opening before them – and so it’s easier to go off and have a conversation over here, where we’ve got some simplified version of the future and of how the world is, that allows us to talk as if we had a chance of setting things right.

    Letting go of that is both vertiginously frightening for people – it’s like looking off a cliff – and it’s also highly moralised. The terrible thing that Paul and I were accused of in the early days of Dark Mountain was ‘giving up’, and that’s about giving up on the stories of progress, giving up the teleological sense of direction and the possibility of mastery. So I’m interested in your experiences of what happens as we create and hold spaces of conversation beyond reform, beyond revolution, beyond any kind of promise of the direction of history.

    VA — I think the giving up of illusions and seeing disillusionment as a generative thing, this is what we’ve been looking at. As you said, modernity is falling and we need to create spaces for things to fall apart generatively. Partly these are the connections that need to be made through the cartographies. Partly it’s about supporting people to work through denial. In this sense, we have been talking about three denials.

    The first is the denial of violence: this house, this system that rewards us and gives us enjoyment and security, was created through violence and it is maintained by violence. So there’s an illusion of innocence and a denial of systemic violence that needs to go. Then there’s an illusion about linear progress and the possibility of continuity, this is the denial of the limits of the planet. The third denial is the denial of entanglement. We are not separated from the metabolism that is the planet, but there’s an illusion of separation – from land, from other beings, from each other, and even within ourselves, from the complexities of our own being. Once you start connecting these three illusions together, there is a falling apart. There’s also a sense that if you can’t do anything that leads to something in a teleological way, you’re not doing anything.

    This structure of modernity has created a feedback loop that starts with fears: a fear of chaos, a fear of loss, a fear of death, a fear of pain, a fear of pointlessness, worthlessness and meaninglessness that then become allocated desires for specific things. So for example, the fear of scarcity becomes a desire for accumulation. And then these desires, within the modern structures and feedback loops, become entitlements: the desire for accumulation becomes, in turn, a perceived entitlement to property or ownership.

    There are several of these feedback loops that make it very difficult for us to imagine anything otherwise or feel secure in embarking on things that could emerge, but that are unfamiliar and that don’t feed the feedback loops. At this point, we talk about the grammar of modernity, what makes things legible within modernity. Because of the reduction of being to knowing, legibility and the idea that reality can be indexed is what provides security. So from there we ask: what is the grammar that makes things legible and thus the only things that become real and ideal? If you want to put the world in a box, what is the size of this box and is it a square box? How does the world need to be, in order to be contained in this box? So we talk about illegibilities: things that are viable, but unimaginable, unthinkable within this grammar.

    DH — Possibilities that can’t be seen through these lenses.

    VA — Yes – and because we’re working with indigenous knowledge systems, or systems of being, we talk about the problems of trying to graft these systems into the same boxes we are used to. In that sense, we talk about what’s invisibilised. And there’s a need for not trying to make this visible. You need to make what’s invisible visibly absent first; otherwise, what you’re doing is just a translation into the grammar that you already have. We talk about exiled capacities, which are neurobiological states that may offer different kinds of security or stability, even without having a formalised notion of security. These could help us be together without the need to mediate our relationships in articulated knowledge. Through modernity, we relate to each other through knowledge filters, which makes sense to its grammar – but there are other possibilities for relationship, where these knowledge filters are not as important or as thick as we have been socialised into wanting.

    If we are not well in our relationship first with where we are – not just in geographical terms, but in a broader sense – there’s no chance we’re going to be able to have healthy one-on-one relationships. We need to be there and then through the unknowability – because there is not a knowing place, it’s a being place – through the unknowability of this being there is where you can connect with other people. So first, you relate through a vital compass, a compass of vitality. Then you have a more intellectual compass that works with it, but is not more important.

    DH — That image of a compass of vitality, it makes me think of Ivan Illich talking about conviviality and placing that emphasis on certain ways of being together, coming alive together.

    VA — That’s definitely part of it, but this vitality is not just human. It’s through the perception of vitality in everything, the unknowable vitality, that we sense our entanglement with the world.

    Suely Rolnik also talks about the vital compass, about how we are being fertilised by the world in unmediated ways, all the time; some gestations come to term, others do not. She talks about the fact that our vital compass is not being given space or developed, so we are having a lot of abortions of possibilities. This is because we want the moral compass to be the only mediator of reality, and this compass is broken.

    DH — Wow, what a powerful set of images.

    VA — I know! The abortion of possibilities really struck me… I suppose it’s true because if you are afraid of engaging with the world in an unmediated way, you’re not going to allow most gestations to come to term. You want to have autonomy and control over the life that you perceive to be only yours.

    DH — There’s a conversation I’ve had with various people about steering by a sense of what you come alive to – and learning to trust, to pay attention to this subtle sense of vitality. If something is dying a little, notice that, and don’t allow anything to be so important that it overrides that awareness and the message it is bringing, the message that something is wrong. To me, this image of the vital compass speaks to that set of conversations and experiences.

    VA — Suely Rolnik also has ten propositions to decolonise the unconscious. We have translated them from Portuguese in one of the collective’s publications. There are five in our version – and I think this little death you are talking about is there in those propositions.

    DH — That mention of the unconscious brings me to something else I wanted to ask you about. I’ve noticed you talk about your work as a collective in terms of a form of ‘non-Western psychoanalysis’. That struck me as a very curious phrase and I’m interested to hear more about that as a framing of what you’re up to.

    VA — Western psychoanalysis draws attention to the unconscious, to the desires and yearnings that drive our decisions and the ways we think. However, the ontology behind it is either anthropocentric or anthropomorphic. It’s all about bodies or archetypes. It’s useful, but it doesn’t really offer any way to manifest entanglement.

    The idea, for example, that the land dreams through us is not contemplated by Western psychoanalysis – but it is contemplated by other cultures, including indigenous cultures that use psychotropics, for example, where an encounter with a being in a plant will give you dreams that you wouldn’t have otherwise. These dreams help you work through practical knowledge, knowledge of the psyche and knowledge of the divine, and there are neurological, neurobiological and neurochemical changes too. That is how it becomes neurofunctional.

    If these practices are part of your lived reality, you’re talking not just about a chemistry of the brain or its biology, but its functionality: how you start to rely on these dreams, not as a different reality for an escape, but as an extension of the same reality. So we’re coming from learning about practices that do not see the body as the end, the human body – or even the human mythical frame – as the basis of existence…

    DH — As the place where the thing that psychoanalytic tradition is dealing with comes to an end, the limit of the reality it can speak of. I see that.

    VA — Let’s take the land as a living entity – not as a concept, but as a manifestation, because there’s a difference. A manifestation that is more powerful than just human cognition, but where humans are also part of this manifestation. If we flip that, what possibilities for being and knowing and doing and yearning are opened up? We talk about a metabolic intelligence, we’re thinking about a metabolism not only of the Earth but also of what the Earth is embedded in. In this sense, the land is not a resource or an anthropomorphic extension of ourselves, but we are an extension of the land itself.

    If you turn everything to an organic metaphor, we can talk about a metabolism that we’re part of, a metabolism that is sick or that has a big constipation – a lot of shit for us to deal with! Personal shit, collective shit, historical shit, systemic shit. It needs to pass, it needs to be composted, we need to be attentive to it. This shit involves the systemic violence, the complexities of different forms of oppression, the unsustainability of what gives us enjoyment and security, and the illusion of separation. So the denials are probably the cause of the constipation.

    We also talk about a ‘bio-internet’ and accessing a new operating system with new ‘apps’ or un-numbing and re-activating capacities that the house has exiled. In that sense, the engagement with indigenous practices is not about coding these practices as an alternative to modernity or as a supplement to modernity. Rather, it relates to (re)learning or (re)creating habits that can help us to figure out if we can interrupt the feedback loops (of fears, desires and perceived entitlements) of the house of modernity in order to open up possibilities that are currently unintelligible and unimaginable.

    DH — That thought about the possibility of new possibilities brings me back to a phrase of yours that has stuck with me. You talk about ‘hospicing modernity and assisting with the birth of something new, undefined and potentially, but not necessarily, wiser’. After we first met, I was teaching on the first course at a school called HOME, and those words of yours became a touchstone for that week. Afterwards, a guy who was there wrote an article for VICE and hung his whole piece on those words – except that, firstly, he managed to write you out of the story and just ascribe the words to me, and then he left out the second half, the part about the birth of something new.

    What I find striking is that this language of ‘hospicing’ gets used quite a lot in some of the places and conversations that cross paths with Dark Mountain. However, the other half, the assisting with the birth of something new, is often missing in those conversations. Part of that comes, I suspect, from an inability to see much space in between the end of modernity and the end of everything.

    I guess that’s what Paul and I were trying to name in the Manifesto, when we wrote that ‘The end of the world as we know it is not the end of the world, full stop.’ Then, a couple of years later, in a conversation with David Abram for our second book, I stumbled on a further iteration of that thought: ‘the end of the world as we know it is also the end of a way of knowing the world.’ That feels to me like somewhere you’ve been spending a lot of time, finding language for that.

    VA — I think it goes back to the grammar and the feedback loops, too. So there is this desire for certainty, predictability and totalisation, right? You need to know where you’re going, even if it’s extinction! It gives you some security. So how do we open up and interrupt these desires in ways that allow us to take an integrative step into the metabolism, allowing the metabolism itself to show us the way through the vital compass that then recalibrates our intellectual compass.

    It’s very interesting that everywhere I speak about hospicing, there’s always a very strong normative desire for humans to create the new reality. It’s this archetype of agency that is extremely ingrained: the idea that we can create something, and then the lack of faith in humanity to create it, which then plays into this sense of resignation. People say ‘Well, I don’t believe we can do it’, and that’s it.

    What we are trying to get at is that the death we are talking about is an interruption of the totalisation. If it is about a move of integration, a move towards entanglement, towards the metabolism itself, then it’s the metabolism that does the dreaming and the creation. That’s why we don’t say ‘creating’ something new, we say ‘assisting with the birth’ of something new. We are assistants to it, we are not the ones doing it.

    DH — So it’s a humbler role that we might be arriving into, if we’re lucky?

    VA — Absolutely. And it’s very different from this bravado thing about saving the Earth or saving humanity or even saving ourselves or our families, prepping for the end of the world. Existentially, it’s a very different starting point. It’s not even about letting go of the ego, it’s shifting existential direction rather than focusing on form: that’s why we don’t use the word ‘transformation’.

    We are interested in the shift of direction from the neurobiological wiring of separability that has sustained the house of modernity to the neurofunctional manifestation of a form of responsibility ‘before will’, towards integrative entanglement with everything: ‘the good, the bad and the ugly’. This form of responsibility is driven by the vital compass. It is not an intellectual choice nor is it dependent on convenience, conviction, virtue posturing, martyrdom or sacrifice. You can see this responsibility at work in practices of indigenous and Afro-descendent communities that collaborate with the collective.(1) We have been working on the question of how to invite the interruption of the three denials and the composting of our collective and individual ‘shit’ in non-coercive, experiential ways.(2)

    Notes

    (1) See bit.do/billcalhoun and bit.do/webofcures

    (2) See bit.do/decolonialfuturesimpact

    First published in Dark Mountain: Issue 16 – REFUGE, a special edition to mark the tenth anniversary of the Dark Mountain Project.

  • Black Elephants & Skull Jackets: A Conversation with Vinay Gupta

    Black Elephants & Skull Jackets: A Conversation with Vinay Gupta

    Before I know who he is, Vinay Gupta has started telling me about his plan to start a small African country. The drug factory is the important part, apparently – that and the Gurkha mercenaries.

    We’re sitting on the bare floorboards of a townhouse in Mayfair: five storeys of gilded mirrors, marble hallways, handpainted Chinese wallpaper and furniture that looks like it just came out of a skip. In one corner, a large bracket fungus is growing out of the wall, about two feet below the ceiling. It’s the kind of scene that makes you think the world as we know it already ended, you just weren’t paying attention.

    It is January 2009. For months now, the world economy has been visibly in chaos, and even the politicians are starting to acknowledge that the consequences of this won’t be confined to the financial markets. Gupta seems like a man who relishes chaos.

    I’m here because the artists and activists who have squatted this Mayfair palace are about to open its doors to the public. For three weeks, it will become the Temporary School of Thought, a free university where anyone can pitch up and offer classes. Gupta and I have just joined the faculty: I’m offering lectures on ‘Deschooling Everything’ and ‘Economic Chemotherapy’, but this feels pretty tame compared to his curriculum which takes in ‘Infrastructure for Anarchists’, ‘Biometrics for Freedom’, ‘Avoiding Capitalism for the Next Four Billion’ and ‘Comparative Religion’.

    For some reason, this last one sounds like a euphemism.


    He’s the kind of character you want to run a background check on. Anyone who shows up in a squat, wearing a black jacket with a black skull printed on the back, telling stories about his work for the Pentagon, his plans to fix global poverty and his friendly Gurkha mercenaries deserves a background check.

    What makes it worse is when the stories check out. You can find the Defense Horizons paper he co-authored with the former Chief Information Officer of US Department of Defense. Then there’s the Hexayurt – the refugee shelter he invented, which can be assembled from local materials, costs less than a tent and lasts for years. Evidence of this turns up in photographs from the park at the centre of the Pentagon to the playa at Burning Man.

    Like a one-man Alternate Reality Game, he’s conscious of the need to leave a trail of evidence. ‘Otherwise, no one would ever believe me!’


    The jacket, the hand-printed business cards, the over-the-top invented organisations – for a while, the cards say ‘Global Apocalypse Mitigation Agency’ – are partly geek humour, the residue of his early career as a software engineer. They’re also a strategy for living with the kind of extreme situations Gupta spends his time thinking about.

    He works on big problems: how to prevent biometrics becoming a tool for genocide; how to deal with the survivors after a nuclear terror attack on a US city; what to do if H5N1 goes pandemic at a 50% Case Fatality Rate. (His briefing paper on severe pandemic flu contains the advice: ‘Do not count the dead. Count the living.’)

    At the Rocky Mountain Institute, he helped edit two of Amory Lovins’ books: Small is Profitable, on decentralised energy, and Winning the Oil Endgame, on moving the United States to a zero-oil future. The latter was paid for by Donald Rumsfeld’s office, when he was Secretary of Defense, and is credited with shaping Bush’s State of the Union speech in 2006, with its pledge to end America’s ‘addiction’ to oil.

    ‘I wish they’d followed up that speech with action,’ Gupta says, when I mention this.

    His real obsession, though, is poverty – something he attributes to his family background, half-Indian, but born and raised in Scotland.

    ‘When I was a kid, my mother and father visited some of our family in Calcutta. I remember them telling me stories of how these relatives – middle class people, teachers – lived in a swanky area of town, but in a really lousy apartment. In the kitchen they kept a brick on top of the chapatis so that rats coming in through the open window wouldn’t drag them away!’

    The complex cultural awareness bundled together in that story bears unpacking: that people have drastically different experiences of life, that things he – as a child growing up in Scotland – couldn’t imagine living with were normal to others. ‘And that they were my relatives, people like me.’


    A few weeks after the encounter in the Mayfair squat, and after a lot of long conversations over Chinese food, the Institute for Collapsonomics comes into being. Gupta and I are among its founders.

    The Institute is at least half a joke, a sister organisation for the Global Apocalypse Mitigation Agency. But it is also a crossing point for people from very different personal and professional backgrounds who, for one reason or another, have found themselves thinking seriously about what happens if and when the systems we’re meant to rely on start to fail.

    We convene in the back corner of Hing Loon, which does the best eggplant with garlic sauce in Chinatown, or after hours in somebody’s office. We invite former hedge fund managers and Ukrainian government officials to discuss the causes and realities of economic collapse. We gatecrash think tank seminars, with mixed results. The two of us spend three hours at a cafe in St James’s Park, arguing about pandemic flu and the role of government with a guy from the Cabinet Office. One Friday afternoon we invite ourselves to the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts, turning up mob-handed to what turns into the most chaotic meeting I have ever attended.

    On our way back from that meeting, we alight upon a logo which embodies the spirit of collapsonomics. The Black Elephant is an unholy union of two boardroom clichés: the Elephant in the Room, the thing which everyone knows is important, but no one will talk about; and the Black Swan, the hard-to-predict event which is outside the realm of normal expectations, but has enormous impact. The Black Elephant is an event which was quite foreseeable, which was in fact an Elephant in the Room, but which, after it happens, everyone will try to pass off as a Black Swan. We think we have spotted a few of these.


    A year on, by the time we sit down to record this interview, two things have happened.

    On the one hand, the sense of panic which characterised the early months of the economic crisis has subsided. Stock markets have regained most of their losses, economic statistics inform us that the recession is over – for now, at least.

    Yet even as green shoots continue to be spotted, the headlines suggest another possibility. Emergency talks over a bailout for Greece to prevent a Euro collapse. Sarah Palin tells Tea Party activists America is ready for a second revolution. And here in the UK, more news piles up every day about huge cuts in public spending for schools, universities, local authorities.

    Reading the papers, it feels less like the crisis is over – more like it became the new normal. Did collapsonomics just go mainstream?

    Then again, in the UK, our idea of a crisis is that we have hit Peak Student: the point at which economic reality and funding cuts mean less young people will go to university year-on-year, rather than more. Meanwhile, in Haiti, a country which had little left to collapse, a disaster is playing out on an utterly different scale.

    Two days after our interview, Science for Humanity announces that it is raising funds to carry out research into the deployment of the Hexayurt as a shelter solution for some of the million people made homeless by the Haitian earthquake. This would be the first large-scale application on the ground of a project on which Gupta has been working since 2002.

    After a year of kicking around together, one of the things that strikes me is his ability to bridge these different worlds, the changes underway in Western countries – inconveniences perceived as disasters, for the most part – and the present day extremes of life and death in the world of the very poor. This is one reason I’ve been keen to put some of our conversations on the record, to talk about where the kind of practical thinking he’s doing connects to the cultural questions opened up by a project like Dark Mountain.

    The interview takes place, naturally, in a Chinese restaurant. It is after midnight. Both of us on laptops, talking and typing, so that a transcript is produced as we go. This method seems to work. A flow of other diners come and go, their conversations our backdrop: the Estonian girl who sold books door-to-door for the same company I had done a decade ago, the stand-up comics who just finished a gig, the group of drunk guys who interrupt us to ask if we’re playing Battleships.

    ‘Something like that,’ we tell them.


    DH: Dark Mountain is about what happens when we accept that our current way of living might just not be sustainable, however many wind farms we build. So I guess I wanted to start with your prognosis for that way of living.

    VG: Well, firstly, which ‘we’ are we talking about here? We as in Europeans and Americans? Or we as in people, period, globally? Because the hard part of this problem is actually thinking globally, about all of the people – and the diversity in our ways of lives and exposure to environmental and economic risks is huge.

    Some cultures are right at the edge of the envelope already, and washing over the edge: island nations, the Inuit, semi-arid agriculturists in general. Other cultures are pretty bang-centre and fairly stable. Iowa isn’t going to stop growing corn any time soon, but the whole of sub-Saharan Africa could be a dustbowl in 20 years.

    So it’s not regular and uniform, it’s all of these little lifestyle niches, some of which will fare better than others against various future scenarios.

    DH: So when people think about ‘collapse’, they should be asking where it’s going to happen, rather than whether it’s going to happen?

    VG: Well, in terms of sustainability, there are two questions. Sustain what? And then, can we sustain those things? Right now, more or less the whole of the debate focuses on whether we can sustain hyperconsumption – and the answer is no, of course not. Something is going to give: oil, climate, topsoil, some other factor we’re not even paying attention to. You can’t just burn the earth’s natural resources like a gas flare on an oil rig forever.

    DH: Yes, for me the thing which sums up what’s screwed about the discourse of ‘sustainability’ is Marks & Spencer’s Plan A campaign. You remember the slogan? ‘Plan A: Because there is no Plan B’. And what I want to know is, well, for whom is there no Plan B? For high-end supermarkets? Or for liveable human existence? Or did we stop making that distinction?

    VG: Precisely. And that’s the cultural narrowing of the sustainability discourse to mean the American and European lifestyle. There is no possible way in which that standard of living is going to be sustained. It’s impossible for two reasons.

    Firstly, ecological constraints. Not just climate, but land use patterns in general. We just don’t have the ability to keep doing this indefinitely, and climate is just the first of a long list of things that can and eventually will go wrong.

    Secondly, and this is less widely understood, even in the most optimistic scenarios globalisation is going to get us. Migration of jobs and capital around the world is making the poor richer, and the rich poorer, with a lot of noise on top of that basic pattern. Another thing that moves wealth around is natural resource scarcity: when people start paying top dollar for oil, the oil states start getting rich. Suppose we wind up with a ‘global middle class’ of, say, four billion people, we’re going to see that same kind of auction pricing and wealth transfer for more or less all natural resources: copper, iron, nickel, even wood.

    So one way or another, even with all the new high tech stuff you can think of, we’re not going to be so much richer than our neighbours on the planet forever. We’re all headed, on average, for a lifestyle about where Mexico is today, and possibly a good deal worse if climate or other factors really start to bite.

    If things go wrong, we could wind up anywhere.

    DH: One of the questions Dark Mountain opens up is what it takes to make life ‘liveable‘. This is very much in play from a cultural perspective. For example, a book like Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road – leaving aside its literary achievement – subtly reinforces a very common, seldom-stated cultural assumption, that life outside of a continuation of American late consumerism is unliveable.

    VG: And that’s where most people are already living! Not in The Road, but outside of the Western consumerist bubble.

    DH: And those are not the same thing. Part of what I find so interesting about your work is that it feels like you’ve arrived at this question – about how we distinguish what makes life liveable from the way you and I happen to be living right now – from a completely different perspective. I got there by reading Ivan Illich and John Berger. You got there by working with Rocky Mountain Institute and the US Department of Defense.

    VG: That and the fact that I’m half-Indian. You can’t underestimate the effect of that: even growing up thousands of miles away from India, there was still the curiosity about how the other half lived, combined with the sense that these people were my relatives, some of them. People like me.

    So fast forward to my early 30s and I’m involved with Rocky Mountain Institute. Now, RMI is really extremely good at infrastructure. Amory is personally incredibly intelligent and sensitive to how large-scale systems work: he’s a master of the complex. I, on the other hand, like simple systems. There was an event called the Sustainable Settlements Charrette in 2002 and what came out of that was a question: can we do a new kind of refugee camp?

    And that was where I suddenly found a new angle on things: apply the RMI infrastructure insights, not to the big, complex western cities, but to the refugees!

    This turned out to be incredibly fruitful, because refugees are a special case of the very poor. Villagers all over the world share many problems with them, problems like water and shelter. So through thinking about how to make life liveable for refugees, you arrive at practical ideas for all these people.

    DH: Ideas which also apply to people in rich countries, when things go wrong?

    VG: Absolutely. Like, what happens after a nuclear attack on a US city? The work on that started at a disaster response event called Strong Angel III, run by Eric Rasmussen, an ex-US Navy surgeon who’s now running InSTEDD.

    A couple of friends and I came as self-supporting American refugees. We swung by Home Depot, picked up about $300 of equipment, and were self-sustaining for shelter, for water, for cooking – and we would’ve been for sanitation, if they’d let us use our composting toilet. People sat up and took notice, because that opened up a lot of new terrain – decentralised response to extreme crisis situations, where you have to make what you need from what you have.

    DH: What strikes me here is that the situations you’re talking about are situations which people – even in government or NGOs or the military – prefer not to think about, because they’re too alarming or too hopeless. And in that sense, there are very strong parallels to the scenarios we’re talking about with serious climate change, resource scarcity, social and economic collapse – take your pick!

    The point being that a lot of the people who’ve been drawn to the conversations around the Dark Mountain Project have reached a place where they no longer find the future offered by mainstream sustainability narratives believable. They’re coming round to the likelihood that we’re going to outlive our way of living – and that feels like giving up, or like once you face that, you might as well give up. We get accused a lot of defeatism – of being the guys who say ‘we’re fucked!’ – and you’re the guy whose job starts at the point where people admit they’re fucked!

    VG: Well, take the work on nuclear terrorism. What I found was that nobody had actually thought about cleaning up after a one-off nuclear attack in a realistic meat-and-potatoes way. They just hadn’t. Worse, the people who looked at my work – senior folks in the kinds of organisations which get to think about this stuff professionally – agreed it was the best plan they had seen, but to my knowledge have not committed to building that response capability. Not because it would not work – nobody’s ever suggested it wasn’t feasible, efficient and necessary – but because it would.

    And that means admitting you might get hit, and are prepared to deal with it. Not a popular position.

    DH: Sounds a lot like being in denial.

    VG: Yes, absolutely it’s denial, and a lot of what I do is denial management.

    When Mike Bennett and I started Buttered Side Down, we consciously did everything possible to push people out of that denial – branding it as a ‘historic risk management consultancy’ and the scary, scary homepage, leavened with the humour of the name.

    You always hit the denial and cognitive dissonance when dealing with the real world. It’s all over everything in our society. TV isn’t helping!

    DH: So I guess the question for a lot of people is, how do you handle these possibilities? How do you admit that it could happen, without feeling like just giving up?

    VG: There’s an easy way, and a hard way. Only the hard way produces results.

    The easy way is nihilism, which is basically escapist. ‘This situation is hopeless,’ you say, ‘but if something else were true then it wouldn’t be hopeless, and then I could re-engage.’

    DH: You mean like people who say ‘well, the climate situation is hopeless, so I’m not going to worry about it’?

    VG: Yes, exactly. They haven’t given up on the hope that somehow it’s all going to work out and allow them to continue to live (and consume) in their current way. They’ve abandoned trying to fix the situation, but deep down they still unconsciously expect that it will somehow all be OK in the end.

    People who are in that position say they’ve abandoned all hope, but they haven’t really. It’s wishful thinking. It’s Goth. It’s the easy way.

    The hard way is mysticism. ‘Look, we are all going to die.’

    ‘The question is only when, and how.’

    DH: Is that mysticism?

    VG: Yep, one way or another. Anybody who thinks about these questions seriously is a mystic. Even atheism, if it’s fully informed by a consideration of death, is a mystery tradition. The mystery is, ‘If we’re all going to die, what is worth living for?’ And the answer is, must be, everything.

    DH: For a lot of people, ‘mysticism’ suggests escapism – a retreat from reality.

    VG: You know, that’s largely a cultural issue in the West. There’s a legacy here of religion being about a mythical state, a salvation. That’s not at all how it worked in pre-Christian traditions, Greek, Roman, Hindu. Those roots go back to something else, not the hope of an afterlife, but a hope for this life.

    Stoicism is European Zen, more than anything else. And Diogenes looks a lot like a sadhu.

    DH: So how does this help you think practically about dealing with situations in which large numbers of people are going to die – whether that’s a climate disaster, or a situation like Haiti right now?

    VG: Large numbers of people? 100%. Everybody is going to die. The only question is when, and how. So it’s not about saving anybody. Talking about saving lives is perpetuating the illusion of living forever. I cannot save a single life. At best, my work allows people to experience more life before they face death, as we all inevitably must: a universal experience which we all face alone; an initiation or an extinction, we cannot say with certainty.

    It’s this vision of the certainty of death which is at the heart of my work.

    DH: How does that change the way you approach these extreme situations?

    VG: There’s this model I came up with called Six Ways to Die. It’s like a mandala, a picture of life and death. In the centre is the individual self: you. At the perimeter of the circle are the six ways to die: too hot or too cold, hunger and thirst, illness and injury. What stands between you and these threats is infrastructure, the stuff that gives you shelter, supply and safety: your house, the power grid, the water purification plant, the sewer pipes, hospitals and Marks & Spencer’s.

    You can’t draw an accurate map of what keeps people alive without having one eye squarely on death, and if you haven’t faced your own mortality more or less fully, Six Ways to Die is very hard on you. Because you will die.

    To fight for people’s lives effectively means understanding that you are fighting for something measured in years, in days, in seconds and moments, not in the sense of some abstract salvation from death itself.

    ‘How can I add to the span of your years?’ is not the same mindset as ‘How can I save you?’ If I fail, I failed to buy you five or 10 or 15 or 50 years, made of days and moments. It’s this time to live and experience which is at stake, not your life per se.

    DH: That shift in mindset – apart from anything else, that’s a substantial change in your sense of your role. I think a lot of us who have been activists, or in some way trying to ‘change the world’, are familiar with the ‘How can I save you?’ role – whether it‘s ‘saving lives’ or ‘saving the planet’.

    VG: It’s all going: us, now; the planet, in a few billion years.

    At birth, we leapt from a building, and it takes 70 or 80 years to hit the ground on a good day. On a bad day, you miss the lower 30 or 50 floors!

    DH: Now that’s dark! But you know, I see a lot of major figures in the environmental movement wrestling with this at the moment. They’ve spent years telling people, if we just try hard enough and get it together, we can save the planet – or rather, we can save our way of living. And they’re no longer convinced, but they feel like if they admit how serious things are, everyone will just give up. And this becomes intensely morally charged.

    When Paul Kingsnorth, my Dark Mountain co-founder, debated George Monbiot in the Guardian last year, the key bit in George’s argument – the bit that got thrown backwards and forwards endlessly in the comments and the blog posts – was his suggestion that we were passive in the face of (or even enthusiastic about) mass death.

    Here’s the bit I’m thinking of. He writes: ‘How many would survive without modern industrial civilisation? Two billion? One billion? Under your vision several billion perish.’

    VG: Look, ‘modern industrial civilisation’ cannot scale to seven billion people. Two billion people in that ecosystem niche are effectively trashing the entire global ecosystem, with climate going first, followed hard on by oceans, deforestation, topsoil and all the rest. Even if it stabilises, the impact as the poor billions who don’t currently use many natural resources pile on to the consumption bandwagon is going to destroy everything.

    This is absolutely and completely obvious. Either the poor are going to continue living in their current conditions or worse – conditions which most industrial nations would consider an apocalypse – or they are going to ‘develop’ and follow us into the burning building.

    DH: I wonder, sometimes, whether the absolute focus on climate change in the environmental movement today is partly a way of avoiding thinking about this larger question?

    VG: Well, climate hits the rich and the poor. It’s scary because it’ll flood Venice and Bangladesh at the same time, and nobody can buy their way out of it. Most of the other ecological collapses allow the richest to buy their way to the end of the line: last tuna syndrome.

    DH: How much will the last tuna to come out of the sea fetch in a Japanese fish market?

    VG: That’s the one.

    DH: Perhaps. I see something else, though. The focus on climate change allows the implication – which I don’t think many environmentalists actually believe – that if it wasn’t for the pesky sensitivity of our climate system to CO2, our way of living, our mode of development, our model of progress would be just fine. I see this in the popular discourse about climate change, from politicians and in the media, and I don’t see it being challenged clearly by mainstream environmentalists.

    VG: It’s all very complicated, and there’s a huge, huge amount of stuff going on. We can’t master the complexity, we don’t have the ability intellectually to master all the science. People are at the edge of their limit to cope. Picking the most pressing problem and screaming about it is an ancient human reflex. TIGER! Climate is our tiger.

    DH: That’s a good point, about people struggling to cope. It’s all very well talking about how someone who comes up with disaster plans for a living handles the possibility of major, discontinuous change – of life being shorter and messier than we grew up expecting it to be – but how about the rest of us?

    VG: Well, I’m not proposing a Zen revolution – not yet, anyway!

    DH: It is quite a thought! But I have a strong sense of people looking for new ways of thinking, tools to adapt, ways to get their heads round the changes we’re likely to live through. I think that’s why Paul and I have had such a strong response since we published the manifesto.

    VG: Well, a simple humanism gets you most of the way: think about poverty first. The poor are already living without all these things we are afraid of losing. They’re too poor to consume much carbon. They eat all organic produce because they can’t afford fertiliser. We are afraid of becoming them, if we trash the planet with our insane greed and the standard of living that comes with it. So when you start to get clear about poverty – and I’ll show you what that’s like in a moment – you start to get clear about limitation.

    Here’s how this works, the back of an envelope version. Six and a half billion people. Half rural, half urban. Of the urban population, about two-thirds are doing OK or very well. One-third – one billion – live in utter, abject poverty. Of the rural population, you’ve got about a billion who are OK, a billion who are really struggling, and a billion who are regularly hungry.

    With me, so far? Four billion in various states of poor, and a couple of billion of those, a third of the people on the planet, with really serious daily personal problems like no dental care beyond having your teeth pulled with rusty pliers.

    This is poverty – and it’s everywhere.

    And how does it work? Average income in the USA is about $100 per day. Average income for the poorest billion is maybe $1 per day. So at global averages, there are 100 people living on this income.

    Now, think about the kind of will-to-blindness it has taken us all to build our consumer paradise while all this is going on around us. That blindness, that wilful ignorance, is what climate change threatens. But it did not start with climate, it started, as everything on Earth does, with poverty.

    All of these people who discovered climate recently? They’d been ignoring poverty their whole lives. The denial is cracking, and it’s going to be messy, but do not assume that the environment is all that’s under the rug.

    DH: This is one of the things we tried to do in the manifesto, though I don’t know if it was clear enough, to piece these things together: climate, resource scarcity, social and economic instability. All these unpredictable, converging tsunamis that we’re facing, all rooted in forms of denial that go generations deep.

    VG: The kind of suffering we are afraid of coming from climate collapse is the ordinary condition of half of the human race.

    DH: Yes. And here’s the question we’ve been moving backwards and forwards across: once you admit that, what do you do next?

    VG: Well, let’s talk about what we really need. Back to Six Ways to Die: shelter, supply and security. Take water: there’s a simple technology, a clay water filter called the Potters for Peace Filtron. It’s a few dollars a unit, can be made anywhere in the world, and it takes out all the bugs. There are lots of similar little innovations for other basic needs. Taken together they can make the villages healthy and good places to live.

    That’s what you need. Everything else is what you want.

    DH: Now, this reminds me of Illich. One of the recurring themes in his work is the massive, unexamined extension of our definition of ‘need’ that has gone on in modern societies: our failure to distinguish between the kind of ground-level needs that you’re talking about and the systems and institutions we happen to be dependent on right now.

    There’s another point from Illich, from one of his essays, ‘Energy and Equity’ – which feels incredibly relevant today, even though it was written nearly 40 years ago. Here’s the passage I’m thinking of: ‘A universal social straitjacket will be the inevitable outcome of ecological restraints on total energy use imposed by industrial minded planners bent on keeping industrial production at some hypothetical maximum.’ In other words, if we frame the question of sustainability as – how do we achieve the most energy-intensive society we can, within ecological limits? – the result is the end of democracy. There is no political choice left about our way of living. Whereas, if we include the range of positions below those limits, we have many possible ways of living.

    VG: You’re talking about hard optimisation, technocratic maximisation of utility. That’s very hard to think through, as you say, without totalitarian control.

    DH: Yes, although today it comes disguised as pragmatism. If you read something like Heat, for example – to pick on George Monbiot, again – it’s not immediately obvious that you’re dealing with ‘maximisation’ of anything. For the purposes of his argument, reducing our emissions to reasonable levels is an almost-impossible task, therefore the least impossible option is the closest we have to a realistic one.

    So there, we’re still talking about achieving maximum possible consumption – what Illich warned was a social straitjacket – but because of the context, in which we’re also talking about such a massive reduction of consumption, it’s easy to miss the assumption that we should consume as much as we can.

    VG: The problem is that we live without restraint in a limited world.

    DH: Also, it’s important to acknowledge the extent to which that problem is cultural. It’s not simply an evolutionary drive that leads us to unlimited consumption, so that every human who ever lived would be doing the same were they in our shoes. You can find examples of times and places where people have lived very differently – and not necessarily because of local ecological constraints or lack of technology, but because they were not acting on the assumption that the source of meaning or satisfaction in life is the maximisation of consumption.

    VG: In general, old cultures get to be old cultures by wisely negotiating with whatever their limits are. In some places it’s land use, not wrecking your soil, in other areas it’s population. But old cultures get to be old cultures by not doing this or anything like it.

    OK, so here’s what it boils down to: are we going to get to be an old culture?

    DH: And again, which ‘we’ are we talking about? Is it really about whether Europe or America becomes an old culture? The ecological problems aren’t limited by one culture or another: all over the world, we see the same patterns of hyperconsumption emerging in their own local versions. It’s a global issue, not just one for us in the West.

    VG: Absolutely – and there’s a historical context to this. American and European exceptionalism has existed in one form or another since the early days of colonialism. It’s hundreds of years of gunboat diplomacy and technological breakouts, as the rest of the world struggled to understand what was happening, and cope with the invaders. And the last cards in that game are going to be played in this present generation.

    In the future, we’re all Mexicans. That’s the standard of living towards which globalisation is driving us. Every country will have its rich and its poor, and some will generally do better than others, but the overwhelming military and technological superiority, which was the foundation of the economic hegemony of America and Europe, is largely at an end.

    Europeans and Americans are soon going to live in the same world as everybody else: the world in which you do not have everything you want, and sometimes you do not have enough. That is coming because the plenty we took for granted was based on the absurd political power imbalances that gunpowder and mechanised war brought us, when only we controlled them. As military force runs out as an option, and industrial production becomes available to everybody, America and Europe lose the economic advantages which came with being in control of the majority of resources of the globe.

    In the future, all of us on Planet Earth are going to be dealing with the fact that there are seven billion of us. In the future, you do not get a jacuzzi. Not unless you are very, very lucky and are one of the rich, or unless your jacuzzi runs on abundant resources, not scarce ones.

    If you live in a hot country, you can use the sun. In a country with abundant biomass, you can burn wood. In a cold country with geothermal springs, you can use the ground. But you are not going to burn natural gas for fun in 50 years time in any scenario I can imagine from here, and that’s the end of a brief, short, foolish age.

    We can still live well, but it must be wisely and appropriately, as if we were going to live a thousand years, but knowing we will not.

    DH: You know, that sounds pretty upbeat, from a man wearing a skull jacket! What’s left, though, is the question of how we get there from here?

    VG: That’s exactly what we don’t know. It’s where the history of the 21st century is going to be made, in the same way that wrestling with the nuclear bomb was the defining dilemma of the twentieth-century.

    We don’t have a canned solution for this one, it’s a whole culture, and a whole world, engaging with a problem we’ve never seen before. It’s a pass/fail grade on evolution. It’s not a problem which can be project-managed.

    DH: What’s striking is, when you talk about this, you sound hopeful.

    VG: The hope starts at the point when you give up. I’m going to die one day, so are you, and the most we can expect from this life is to enjoy the ride. As long as the grass still grows, and the young are optimistic, life will be wonderful.


    First published in Dark Mountain: Issue 1.